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Abstract
Several states and localities have begun to implement various forms of pre-
trial justice reforms aimed at reducing the size of pretrial detainee population.
However, empirical investigation of the effect of such reforms on crimes more
broadly (other than recidivism) is limited. We analyze the effect of the New
Jersey Criminal Justice Reform implemented in 2017 on property crimes. We
find that property crime per 100,000 population increased by 22.5% within the
first two years. Our findings suggest that reducing the likelihood of pretrial
detention for less violent crimes can have substantial impact on behavioral
incentives for offenders of such crimes.
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1 Introduction
In the U.S., approximately half a million unconvicted individuals are awaiting trial while
incarcerated, and the number of such pretrial detainees saw an increase of 433% from
1970 to 2015 (Vera Institute of Justice, 2019). In response, a number of states and
localities across the U.S. have begun to reform their pretrial justice systems (see Table
1). While varying in detail, the primary purpose of these reforms is economically rooted.
Specifically, the increase in the size of pretrial detainees imposes a great financial burden
on our society. In addition, the resource-based pretrial release process that makes up
the majority in most jurisdictions in the U.S. favors the haves over the have-nots. As
such, one common aspect of these reforms has been to replace the use of money for bail
(or “monetary bail”) with a statistical risk assessment as a condition of release and to
reduce the overall size of pretrial detainee population. Indeed, such reforms are found to
be effective in reducing the number of pretrial detainees by anywhere from 16% to 90%
(McKinley et al., 2019; Rahman, 2018; Veldman, 2014), as well as flight risk or pretrial
recidivism (Barno et al., 2019; Goldkamp and White, 2006).
To the best of our knowledge, however, little is known about the related question of
how such reforms affect crimes more broadly—other than recidivism. In this paper, we
address this lacuna by examining the effect of pretrial justice reform on property crime.
Property crime serves as a natural starting point of investigation given that the rationale
for pretrial justice reforms is based on aforementioned economic motives and property
crime is known to be well-explained by the economic theory of crime (Kelly, 2000). In
addition, property crimes made up more than 85% of all offenses reported to the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the Uniform Crime Report in 2018.
Research suggests that there are two channels through which a reform on criminal
justice system can affect crime: (1) deterrence and (2) incapacitation (Dobbie et al.,
2018; Miles and Cox, 2014). First, deterrence effect refers to the extent to which expected
sanction changes the relative net benefit associated with committing a crime. Given that
pretrial justice reforms aim to reduce the number of pretrial detainees, incentives for
committing a property crime are expected to increase. Second, incapacitation refers to
segregating certain individuals from our society. As the composition of pretrial detainees
and those released into society changes, property crime is to be affected although the
direction is ambiguous. Given these two forces at play, the overall net magnitude of the
1
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Table 1: Examples of Reforms Adopted Across States and Localities.
Year Summary of Reform
Washington, D.C. From 1963 Set out a presumption of unconditional pretrial
release and adopted procedural protections.
Kentucky From 1976 Banned commercial bail bonds and established
pretrial services.
New Jersey 2017 Adopted risk-based assessment, set speedy trial
limits, and amended constitutional right to bail.
Cook County, IL. 2017 Ability-to-pay determinations before setting
bail and use risk assessment instrument.
Santa Clara County, CA. 2019 Adopted community-sponsored release
and pretrial risk assessment.
Source: Doyle, Bains, and Hopkins (2019).
Note 1: New Mexico and Maryland also adopted reforms in 2014 and 2017, respectively. However, their
reforms do not include using an algorithmic risk assessment (Doyle, Bains, and Hopkins; 2019).
Note 2: Since Washington D.C. and Kentucky conducted multiple series of reform, we list the first year
when the reform was adopted.
effect of pretrial justice reform on property crime remains an empirical question.
In our empirical analysis, we exploit the implementation of the New Jersey Criminal
Justice Reform (hereinafter “CJR”) that went into effect in 2017. Using the county
subdivision level data from the FBI for years between 2012 and 2018, we assess the effect
of the CJR on property crime using difference-in-differences (DID) method. We find that
since the implementation of the CJR, the overall property crime per 100,000 population
in New Jersey saw an approximately 22.5% increase when accounting for a set of county
subdivision characteristics, year fixed effects, state fixed effects, and state-specific time
trend. Each of the three property crime types (burglary, larceny, and vehicle theft) saw
an increase as well. Our graphical and estimation results validate the parallel pre-trend
assumption and various sensitivity checks confirm that our findings are robust.
This paper is related to a few different streams of research. First, there is a large
literature that assesses crime levels in association with various factors of interest, such as
unemployment, inequality, wage distribution, education, etc.1 In particular, this paper is
closely related to prior work that analyzed the effectiveness of detaining certain segments
1For instance, see the following papers on these topics: unemployment (Cook, Watson, and Parker,
2014; Narayan and Smyth, 2004; Raphael and Winter-Ebmer, 2001), inequality (Choe, 2008; Kelly, 2000),
wage distribution (Machin and Meghir, 2004), education (Groot and van den Brink, 2010; Lochner and
Moretti, 2004), etc.
2
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of population in changing the levels of crime, which was often studied in the context of
detaining or deporting illegal immigrants (Miles and Cox, 2014; Stowell, Messner, Barton,
and Raffalovich, 2013). This paper adds to this literature by investigating the impact of
detaining certain individuals on property crime in the context of the CJR.
In addition, there are papers that specifically assess the outcomes of pretrial detention.
Dobbie, Goldin, and Yang (2018) use the detention tendencies of quasi-randomly assigned
bail judges to estimate their effects on outcomes such as probability of conviction, pretrial
flight, recidivism, etc. In addition, there are studies that examine the effects of data-driven
risk assessments that are increasingly being adopted to improve judges’ pretrial release
decisions. For example, Kleinberg et al. (2018) analyze and compare welfare gains from
predictions derived from machine learning approach. Our paper adds to this literature
by documenting the realized changes in property crimes following the implementation of
a state-wide pretrial justice reform that requires the use of statistical risk assessment as
a condition of pretrial release.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the institutional
background of the CJR. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the empirical
strategy. Section 5 presents the main results and Section 6 presents additional analyses.
Section 7 concludes.
2 Institutional Background
Based on the principle of “innocent until proven guilty” and a constitutional right to a
speedy trial, the New Jersey State Assembly passed two legislative measures associated
with the CJR in 2014.2 The two measures, 1) S946/A1910 and 2) SCR128, went into
effect on January 1, 2017.
The first legislative measure, S946/A1910, moves New Jersey’s pretrial release process
from a largely money-based one to a risk-based one and sets speedy trial limits with
respect to pretrial detention (American Civil Liberties Union, 2014). Prior to the reform,
defendants who were unable to post monetary bail were held in jail even if they posed
little risk of danger or flight. Under the CJR, when a defendant is charged on a warrant,
the judge uses the Public Safety Assessment (PSA) that considers nine factors to predict
2For more background information, refer to the Criminal Justice Reform Information Center on the
New Jersey Courts website (https://www.njcourts.gov/courts/criminal/reform.html).
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his or her likelihood of failure to appear in court and risk of committing a new crime (New
Jersey Courts, 2018).3 The defendant is classified as low, moderate, or high risk, and the
judge makes a pretrial release decision along with conditions of release, also considering
arguments from the prosecutor and defense attorney.4 If a defendant is detained pretrial,
the CJR imposes that s/he is subject to speedy trial limits.5
The second legislative measure, SCR128, places a constitutional amendment to autho-
rize pretrial detention of a person in criminal case under certain circumstances (American
Civil Liberties Union, 2014). Previously, the New Jersey State Constitution required the
court to grant bail to a defendant in a criminal case before trial. As a result, courts often
ended up setting excessive bail amounts to prevent those accused of committing serious
offenses from being released. However, this did not prevent those who could afford to pay
from being released. Therefore, proposed amendment to change the constitutional right
to bail was submitted on a ballot and was passed with a 61.8% consent in the general
election (Department of State New Jersey Division of Elections, 2014). Article I, Para-
graph 11 of the New Jersey Constitution now further stipulates that pretrial release of an
offender may be denied if the court finds that no conditions of pretrial release would en-
sure his appearance in court when required, safety of others, or prevention of obstructing
the criminal justice process.
3 Data
The data used in this paper comes from two sources. First, we use logged number of
various types of offenses reported to law enforcement per 100,000 population from the
FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) at the county subdivision level. This is annually
reported data and we use data up to the most recent years currently available, from
2012 to 2018.6 We examine both the aggregate property crime rate and the rate of each
3The nine risk factors are: age at current arrest, current violent offense, pending charge at the time
of arrest, prior disorderly persons conviction, prior indictable conviction, prior violent conviction, prior
failure to appear pretrial in past 2 years, prior failure to appear pretrial older than 2 years, and prior
sentence to incarceration.
4The judge can still set a monetary bail, but not for the purpose of keeping the defendant in jail.
5There are three distinctive limits under the CJR: 1) an indictment must be returned/unsealed within
90 days; 2) a trial must start within 180 days after indictment; and 3) there is an overall limit of 2 years
from detention to trial (Rabner and Grant, 2019).
6The UCR data is constructed based on reports submitted by police or state agencies to the FBI.
Therefore, despite efforts to improve completeness and consistency of the data, there are some limitations
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individual property crime type (i.e., burglary, larceny, and vehicle theft).
Second, consistent with prior literature, we collect the following characteristics for each
county subdivision for each year from the American Community Survey of the U.S. Census
Bureau: share of black, share of households receiving Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program (SNAP), share of households with female head, share of young population aged
between 15 and 24, and unemployment rate. We match the data from American Commu-
nity Survey to the UCR data using state-place federal standard geographic codes (FIPS
codes). This gives us 486 and 2,642 units of county subdivisions in New Jersey and
the Northeast region excluding New Jersey (i.e. Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Mas-
sachusetts, Maryland, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont; Hobbs
(2009)) for each of the years from 2012 to 2018, respectively. Because the classification
of the Northeast region may vary across sources, we also use an alternative definition of
the Northeast region that excludes Maryland and Delaware—because these two states are
sometimes categorized as the South (e.g., U.S. Census)—and check whether results still
hold in Section 6.1.
Table 2: Summary Statistics.
New Jersey Northeast region Diff
Panel A: Property Crime
log(Property crime per 100,000) 7.134 (0.908) 6.965 (1.440) 0.169**
log(Burglary per 100,000) 5.383 (1.200) 5.061 (1.611) 0.322**
log(Larceny per 100,000) 6.812 (0.968) 6.671 (1.525) 0.140**
log(Vehicle theft per 100,000) 3.342 (1.774) 2.990 (1.934) 0.352**
Panel B: Other Characteristics
Share of black 7.874 (12.225) 5.138 (10.816) 2.735
Share of households receiving SNAP 5.314 (5.763) 10.442 (8.223) -5.127
Share of households with female head 0.164 (0.088) 0.175 (0.089) -0.011***
Share of young (between age 15 and 24) 12.034 (3.551) 13.011 (6.601) -0.976
Unemployment rate 8.609 (3.454) 7.629 (3.308) 0.980*
Data Source: UCR and American Community Survey of the U.S. Census Bureau.
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. Asterisks ***/**/* denote p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.1,
respectively.
Table 2 provides summary statistics. In Panel A, we compare property crime rate
statistics in New Jersey to those in the Northeast region prior to the implementation of
such as potential under-reporting of crimes.
5
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3658072
the CJR in 2017. New Jersey tends to have slightly higher crime rates than the Northeast
region. However, note that the observed differences are not necessarily problematic, as
long as they do not change systematically during our sample period. We will investigate
this issue in depth in Section 5. In Panel B, we further compare demographic characteris-
tics of New Jersey to those of the Northeast region at the county subdivision level. Except
for the share of households with female head and unemployment rate, the differences in
the share of black, share of household receiving SNAP, and share of young between New
Jersey and the Northeast region are found to be statistically insignificant.
4 Empirical Strategy
To identify the effects of the CJR, we compare the changes in crime rates in New Jersey
to the changes in the other states in the Northeast region before and after the reform
using the following DID specification:
(1) log(Crime)ist = α + β ·NJi · Postt +Xistγ + δs + ρt + εist.
Throughout this paper, we measure log(Crime)ist using the logged number of each type
of offenses per 100,000 population as reported in the UCR. The subscripts i, s, and t
capture county subdivision, state, and year, respectively. NJi is a binary indicator which
equals 1 if county subdivision i is located in New Jersey, and 0 otherwise. Postt equals
1 for years 2017-2018, and 0 otherwise. Xist is a vector of demographic characteristics
of county subdivision i located in state s at time t, such as the share of black, share of
households receiving SNAP, share of households with female head, share of young, and
unemployment rate. δs is a state-fixed effect which controls for unobserved time-invariant
heterogeneity within the state. ρt is a year fixed effect that controls for common trends
within each year. Lastly, εist is an idiosyncratic shock. To account for serial correlation
within a state, we cluster standard errors at the state level. In our baseline analysis, we
use the aforementioned states in the Northeast region that are geographically proximate
to New Jersey as the control group.
The key identifying assumption in DID to recover the causal impacts of the CJR
(i.e., β in equation (1)) is that the outcomes of interest between New Jersey and the
control states in the Northeast region are parallel in the absence of the reform. To test
6
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the validity of this assumption, we first graphically examine whether the trends of the
outcome variables are indeed parallel before the reform period. In addition, we formally
test the parallel trend assumption by estimating the following equation using the data
during the pre-reform period (i.e., before 2017).
(2) log(Crime)ist = α + β ·NJi · t+Xistγ + δs + ρt + εist.
The goal is to see whether the coefficient β in equation (2) is statistically insignificant
from zero. If β is statistically insignificant from zero, then this further provides evidence
that the parallel trend assumption is not violated.
We also conduct various robustness checks and additional analyses. First, we conduct
our analyses using two alternative control groups: 1) the Northeast region excluding
Delaware and Maryland; and 2) all other 49 U.S. states. Second, following Abadie et al.
(2010), we construct synthetic control states such that they are most comparable to New
Jersey before the CJR in terms of various crime rates and other control variables. Then we
compare how the trends diverged after the CJR between New Jersey and these synthetic
control states. Third, following an event study approach, we estimate coefficients on
time relative to the implementation of the CJR and track their trajectories. Fourth, we
explore whether the effects of the CJR on crime rates were heterogeneous across county
subdivisions within New Jersey given their poverty levels. Lastly, we also estimate and
compare the impact of the CJR on violent crimes at the aggregate level.
5 Results
To begin, we check the parallel trend assumption by illustrating the trends of logarithmic
property crime rates in New Jersey and the control group (i.e., other states in the North-
east region) in Figure 1. The units of all crime rates in the y-axis are in terms of logged
crime per 100,000 population. Although crime rates were slightly higher in New Jersey
relative to the control group, the figures show that there was a comparable parallel path
before the implementation of the CJR in 2017, which is marked by a vertical red line. The
trends of vehicle theft seems to show a slight divergence from 2016, but the gap between
the rest of property crime rates in New Jersey and those in control group only widens from
2017. In addition to the graphical illustrations, we further check the parallel trend as-
7
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sumption by estimating equation (2) for years before the CJR’s implementation. Results
are reported in Table 3. None of the coefficients for NJ × t are statistically significant at
standard levels, suggesting that the parallel trend assumption is not violated.
Based on these checks conducted on the key identifying assumption, we now estimate
the main equation (1) using OLS. The key variable of interest is NJ × Post, which
measures the extent to which property crime rate is affected by the implementation of
the CJR. The results are reported in Table 4. In Panel A, we report the effects on the
overall property crime rate, followed by results in Panel B on each of the three property
crime types. In column (1), we do not include any set of controls or fixed effects. Given
such specification, the impact of the CJR is estimated to be statistically insignificant. In
column (2), we include the aforementioned set of control variables and year fixed effects.
We find that overall property crime rate, as well as the rates of burglary, larceny, and
8
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Table 3: Testing the Parallel Trend Assumption before 2017.
Dep. variable: Property Crime Burglary Larceny Vehicle Theft
NJ × t 0.001 -0.010 0.011 -0.002
(0.017) (0.013) (0.019) (0.024)
Observations 11,921 11,926 11,924 11,925
R-squared 0.11 0.17 0.09 0.18
Controls Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
State Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Note: All dependent variables are measured as the logged crime per 100,000 population.
For control variables, we use share of black, share of households receiving SNAP, share of
households with female head, share of young, and unemployment rate. Standard errors in
parentheses are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the state level. Asterisks
***/**/* denote p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.1, respectively.
vehicle theft, all show statistically significant increases. Such results are still robust, after
including state fixed effects in column (3), although the magnitude of effects tend to
become slightly smaller. In column (4), we include state-specific time trend to further
minimize the omitted variable bias. That is, we address a potential concern that our
estimates are just picking up some state-specific time trend that arises from something
other than the CJR. Relative to the other states in the Northeast region, we still find
consistent positive effects of the CJR on property crime rates. New Jersey experienced a
22.5% increase in overall property crime per 100,000 population accounting for a set of
county subdivision characteristics, year fixed effects, state fixed effects, and state-specific
time trend. Larceny, which had the smallest magnitude of impact, still increased by
approximately 19.9% with the same specification.
The behavioral effect of the CJR on property crime through the deterrence channel
is expected to be positive. As it reduces the number of pretrial detainees, it can increase
incentives to commit a nonviolent offense. On the other hand, the effect of the CJR on
property crime through the incapacitative channel is less clear as the composition of the
detained and the released changes. To the extent that pretrial detainees under the CJR’s
risk-based assessment process are indeed more likely to commit crimes, the CJR’s impact
on property crime is likely to be negative. However, the impact could potentially be
positive if those who are released into the society under the risk-based assessment system
have higher risks of committing crimes. Based on previous findings in the literature, it
9
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Table 4: The Effects of the CJR on Property Crime Rate.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Overall Property Crime
log(Property Crime per 100,000 population)
NJ × Post 0.025 0.402** 0.211*** 0.203**
(0.140) (0.145) (0.047) (0.090)
Observations 17,764 17,746 17,746 17,746
R-squared 0.00 0.09 0.13 0.13
Panel B: Property Crime by Type
log(Burglary per 100,000 population)
NJ × Post -0.085 0.510** 0.154*** 0.195***
(0.207) (0.208) (0.036) (0.057)
Observations 17,770 17,752 17,752 17,752
R-squared 0.00 0.13 0.19 0.19
log(Larceny per 100,000 population)
NJ × Post 0.030 0.393** 0.224*** 0.182*
(0.133) (0.137) (0.053) (0.093)
Observations 17,767 17,749 17,749 17,749
R-squared 0.00 0.08 0.11 0.11
log(Vehicle theft per 100,000 population)
NJ × Post 0.482** 0.488* 0.274*** 0.254**
(0.208) (0.239) (0.066) (0.114)
Observations 17,769 17,751 17,751 17,751
R-squared 0.00 0.12 0.19 0.19
Controls Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y
State Fixed Effects Y Y
State-specific time trend Y
Note: For control variables, we use share of black, share of households receiving SNAP, share
of households with female head, share of young, and unemployment rate. Standard errors in
parentheses are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the state level. Asterisks ***/**/*
denote p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.1, respectively.
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does not seem to be the case that the increase in crime rate is driven by recidivism of
those who are no longer detained pretrial. For example, Dobbie, Goldin, and Yang (2018)
find that “initial pretrial release has a small and statistically insignificant effect on post-
trial incarceration.” Therefore, the magnitude of incapacitative effect on property crime
is unlikely to be large, even if it is positive. Although our findings cannot separate the
magnitudes of deterrence effect and incapacitative effect, the overall net effect implies that
positive effect from the deterrence channel seems to be non-negligible. That is, the extent
to which removing pretrial detention for less violent crimes seems to have substantial
effects on behavioral incentives for offenders of such crimes.
6 Additional Analyses
6.1 Alternative Control Groups
Table 5: The Effects of the CJR on Property Crime using Alternative Control Groups.
Dep. variable: Property Crime Burglary Larceny Vehicle Theft
Panel A: Alternative Control Group 1: Northeast Region excluding DE and MD
NJ × Post 0.216** 0.202*** 0.195* 0.269**
(0.091) (0.058) (0.095) (0.116)
Observations 16,975 16,981 16,978 16,980
R-squared 0.13 0.19 0.11 0.19
Panel B: Alternative Control Group 2: All Other States in the U.S.
NJ × Post 0.086* 0.085** 0.066 0.302***
(0.043) (0.040) (0.045) (0.042)
Observations 65,082 65,134 65,162 65,202
R-squared 0.15 0.21 0.12 0.20
Controls Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
State Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
State-specific linear time trend Y Y Y Y
Note: All dependent variables are measured as the logged crime per 100,000 population. In Panel A, the
control group includes Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island,
and Vermont. For control variables, we use share of black, share of households receiving SNAP, share of
households with female head, share of young, and unemployment rate. Standard errors in parentheses
are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the state level. Asterisks ***/**/* denote p<0.01,
p<0.05, p<0.1, respectively.
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Despite our evidence shown in Figure 1 and Table 3, there may still be concerns that
other states in the Northeast Region may not serve as most suitable control group to
predict counterfactual outcomes in the absence of the CJR. To confirm the robustness of
our findings, we repeat our DID analyses using two alternative control groups. In Panel
A, we report the results based on an analysis where the control group is defined as the
Northeast region excluding Delaware and Maryland. In Panel B, we use all other 49 states
in the U.S. besides New Jersey as the control group. We report our estimates that include
all controls, year fixed effects, state fixed effects, and state-specific linear time trend using
these two alternative control groups in Table 5. We find that except for the statistically
insignificant effect on larceny in Panel B, all other effects are still positive and statistically
significant at standard levels.
6.2 Synthetic Control Method
To construct a yet another alternative control group, we follow Abadie et al. (2010). That
is, we use crime rates before the CJR implementation and the set of control variables to
construct a weighted combination of states in the Northeast region to be used as the
control group that most closely fits New Jersey before the reform.7 By comparing New
Jersey to this synthetic control group, we can predict what would have happened to
property crime rate in New Jersey had the CJR not been implemented. Figure 2 shows
the trends of property crime rates in New Jersey and the synthetic control group. By
construction, the levels of property crime rates for New Jersey and synethtic control group
are almost identical prior to the reform. Following the reform in 2017, however, all four
graphs show that there is a diverging trend as New Jersey faces an increase in property
crime rates as compared to the synthetic control group. These results are consistent with
our previous findings.
6.3 Year-specific Coefficient Trajectories.
We use the event-study analysis method to examine the evolution of property crime rate
for each of the years before and after the implementation of the CJR. This not only helps
us to further validate the identification assumption, but also to check the magnitude of
7We use the Stata module “synth,” following Abaide et al. (2011).
12
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Notes: Vertical lines mark the implementation timing of the CJR in New Jersey. All variables are
measured as the logged crime per 100,000 population. To calculate state weights in synthetic New Jersey,
we used each type of property crime rates, share of black, share of households receiving SNAP, share of
households with female head, share of young, and unemployment rate prior to the reform.
the effects of the CJR across years. For this aim, we estimate the following:
(3) log(Crime)ist = α+
∑
k∈{−5,−4,−3,−2,0,1}
βkNJi · I(t = 2017 + k) +Xistγ + δs + ρt + εist.
The coefficients of interest are the βk’s, which are the coefficients on time indicators
relative to the CJR. For instance, k = −2 captures the impact on crime rate two years
before the CJR. One year before the CJR, or year 2016 equivalently, is the omitted
category. We show the estimated βk’s for each property crime type, along with the 95%
confidence intervals in Figure 3. This allows us to visually assess how crime rate outcomes
appear to have changed sharply around the reform. Almost all coefficients for the years
13
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Notes: The points in each figure represent the estimated effects of event time (i.e., the βk’s from equation
(3)), along with bars representing the 95% confidence intervals. One year before the CJR (i.e., year 2016)
is the omitted category.
prior to the CJR are insignificantly different from zero; if anything, it appears that vehicle
theft and larceny have slightly decreased two years before the CJR. Once the CJR went
into effect, we find that the rates of the overall property crime, burglary, larceny, and
vehicle theft all increased. In addition, we find that the magnitude of the increase in the
year of the CJR’s implementation (i.e., 2017) was very similar to that in year 2018, except
for vehicle theft which showed a further increase in 2018.
6.4 Heterogeneous Effects
We now analyze heterogeneous effects of the CJR across the different county subdivi-
sions in New Jersey. In particular, we investigate whether the increase in property crimes
14
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Table 6: Heterogeneous Effects of the CJR by SNAP Share.
(1) (2) (3)
A. Overall Property Crime
log(Property Crime per 100,000 population)
NJ × Post 0.312* 0.141** 0.132
(0.157) (0.062) (0.095)
NJ × Post × SNAP 0.013*** 0.010** 0.010**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 17,764 17,746 17,746
R-squared 0.09 0.13 0.13
B. Property Crime by Types
log(Burglary per 100,000 population)
NJ × Post 0.382 0.079 0.120
(0.236) (0.064) (0.068)
NJ × Post × SNAP 0.019*** 0.011* 0.011*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 17,752 17,752 17,752
R-squared 0.13 0.19 0.19
log(Larceny per 100,000 population )
NJ × Post 0.295* 0.140* 0.098
(0.146) (0.067) (0.098)
NJ × Post × SNAP 0.014*** 0.012** 0.012**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 17,749 17,749 17,749
R-squared 0.08 0.11 0.11
log(Vehicle theft per 100,000 population)
NJ × Post 0.375 0.255*** 0.235*
(0.249) (0.064) (0.107)
NJ × Post × SNAP 0.016** 0.002 0.002
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
Observations 17,751 17,751 17,751
R-squared 0.12 0.19 0.19
Controls Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y
State Fixed Effects Y Y
State-specific time trend Y
Note: For control variables, we use share of black, share of households receiving SNAP,
share of households with female head, share of young, and unemployment rate. Standard
errors in parentheses are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the state level.
Asterisks ***/**/* denote p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.1, respectively.
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was particularly larger for poorer areas, which have higher shares of households receiving
SNAP. We present the estimation results in Table 6, which shows that the increase in the
overall property crime rate, as well as burglary and larceny, were particularly larger in
county subdivisions with higher SNAP shares. Alternatively, we tried using the share of
households below poverty level instead of SNAP share and find estimates to be mostly con-
sistent. Overall, our findings in Table 6 suggest that when the CJR reduces the expected
sanction on less violent crimes by releasing offenders of such crimes pretrial, there may
be more marginal offenders who now commit property crimes in poorer neighborhoods.
6.5 Effects on Violent Crime
Table 7: The Effects of the CJR on Violent Crime.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. variable: log(Violent Crime per 100,000 population)
NJ × Post -0.421** -0.319 -0.179*** -0.001
(0.123) (0.199) (0.032) (0.046)
Observations 17,762 17,744 17,744 17,744
R-squared 0.00 0.17 0.22 0.22
Controls Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y
State Fixed Effects Y Y
State-specific time trend Y
Note: For control variables, we use share of black, share of households receiving
SNAP, share of households with female head, share of young, and unemployment rate..
Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered at
the state level. Asterisks ***/**/* denote p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.1, respectively.
Instead of property crimes, we alternatively analyze the effects of the CJR on violent
crimes for a comparison. Given that each of the violent crime types (e.g. murder, rape,
etc.) tends to have very small number of occurrences at the county subdivision level,
we focus on the overall violent crime rate. Unlike property crime, violent crime tends to
have less clear economic motives. For example, Kelly (2000) finds that “Property crime is
well explained by the economic theory of crime, while violent crime is better explained by
strain and social disorganization theories” (p.530). However, if we just focus on deterrence
and incapacitative effects on violent crimes, the effects are expected to be negative to the
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extent that the risk-based assessment system under the CJR successfully detains offenders
of violent crime. We check whether this is the case in Table 7 by estimating equation (1)
with violent crime rate as the dependent variable. The results show that effects are all
estimated to be negative across specifications, although it is insignificant when controls,
year fixed effects, state fixed effects, and state-specific time trend are included in the
specification.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the impact of pretrial justice reform on property crime
using the implementation of the New Jersey Criminal Justice Reform in 2017. We find
that the overall property crime rate, as well as the rate of each property crime type
(i.e., burglary, larceny, and vehicle theft), all increased within the first two years of the
reform’s implementation. This implies that the extent to which the CJR affects behavioral
incentive to commit a property crime by reducing the expected sanctions upon arrest is
non-negligible. We conduct various sensitivity checks and additional analyses to provide
robustness of our findings.
Whereas our findings provide one of the first pieces of evidence on how pretrial justice
reforms can affect property crime, there are some caveats as well as possible extensions
to consider. First, as our analysis is currently limited to the state of New Jersey, the
effects may not be readily generalized to other states due to potential heterogeneity.
Although there were reforms adopted by other localities and states as can be seen in
Table 1, observations from other state-level reforms during recent periods are lacking. As
more states adopt similar reforms, it would be interesting to explore effects on a broader
scale in the future by exploiting the variations in timing of the implementations of such
reforms across different states. Second, we do not have individual-specific information
on crime. With additional micro-level data and modelling, it would be interesting to
further investigate the separate magnitudes of deterrence and incapacitation effects, as
well as the recidivism of those released pretrial versus and arrests by first-time offenders.
Third, as the CJR was implemented relatively recently, we focused on its short term
consequences for the two-year post-period using all the data currently available. As
effects could dynamically evolve across time, one could further include more years as data
becomes available to assess mid to long term consequences. Finally, it is possible that the
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increase in property crime rate is affected by increased efforts in monitoring and policing.
Nevertheless, we believe this is less likely to be the driving force following the analogous
logic as in Kang (2017). If this were the case, then it is highly likely that we would have
observed increases in all types of crime rates. However, we only find consistent increases
in property crimes but not in violent crimes.
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